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The past century of southern African history is dominated by the
development of the mining industry and associated social changes such as
the entrenchment of migrant labour in the mining economy. The particular
patterns of capitalism in this part of the world have resulted in a
peculiar combination of social characteristics. Incomplete
proletarianisation combines with massive structural unemployment. Private
property in land coexists with an elaborate state/racial allocation system
in the countryside as well as the towns. The evolution of some aspects of
these features has been subjected to relatively little scrutiny. In
particular, the importance of control over land for the shaping of daily
life and social relationships would bear much more intensive study.
Although historians and others have investigated some of its components -
at grand economic scale as well as more intimate studies of social
movements' - the role of land as an ingredient in social relationships
poses questions not yet addressed. Despite the centrality of land to the
traditional field of historical geography, that discipline is poorly
developed in South Africa and seldom examines issues relating to land.=
In research on land ownership, control and access, one of the central
questions which arises is the role of land in relation to analytical
categories such as class. In some cases there is very substantial
evidence of the modifying effects which 'land relations' have on social
relations more generally. One group of examples from which such evidence
readily emerges is what I like to call the 'peripheral mining centres' of
South Africa.
These peripheral mining centres include a great diversity of places, some
of which are no longer mining towns at all. The particular examples which
I have explored include Pilgrims Rest (gold - now a "historical tourist
attraction'), Koegas (asbestos - a ghost town), and Indwe (coal -
presently a tiny commercial centre). In each case the mining companies
concerned enjoyed a variety of forms of control over usually very
substantial areas of land, and social relations in their vicinity came to
be more or less affected by that land control. At Koegas, and in the
surrounding districts, Cape Asbestos employed its land as an ingredient in
its widespread system of mining on tribute, creating an almost infinitely
graded hierarchy of places in a complex social system. At Pilgrims Rest,
Transvaal Gold Mining Estates used its land to establish a stable core for
a labour force, by developing a rent-paying, mine-labour tenant
system.3 At Indwe on the other hand, the company concerned failed to
use its land to such advantage. But that failure was not for want of
trying. This paper is a brief examination of the conditions which
prevailed at a place which was both a mining centre and a pivotal point in
the travels of migrants from the Transkei to the Transvaal and elsewhere.
It touches on incomplete proletarianisation, some of the meaning of
private property in land, and forced removal: all questions in which
social relations structured at least in part through land relations
played, and play, a major role.
Indwe is a small town in the Cape Province about 70 kilometers north-east
of Queenstown. It lies at the toe of a branch of the Orakensberg
mountains, sandwiched between those ranges and the Transkei border. To
the south-west stretches the old Tembu Location of the Oueenstown
division, better known as the Glen Grey district; to the south-east,
Xalanga district, once part of Emigrant Tembuland. The town is half a
kilometer west of the Indwe river, which between 18^7 and 1883 formed the
boundary between the Cape Colony and Emigrant Tembuland. Indwe lies on a
railway line from Sterkstroom (on the East London-Free State line) to
Maclear; nowadays, a major tarred road runs across the Cape from west to
east which passes through Molteno, Dordrecht, Indwe, Elliot and Maclear.
The part of the Cape in which Indwe lies might be considered remote by
most people, and to reinforce the impression, the environment in the
surrounding districts is mostly bleak and cold, though the scenery is
beautiful and at times breathtaking.
In its obscurity, Indue has some forgotten claims to fame. A roneoed
municipal history, produced some decades ago, claims that the town was
fourth in South Africa to be lit by electricity." This peculiarity in
so remote an area was rendered possible by the coal mines in the
vicinity. Indeed, coal is the obvious reason for the existence of the
town. Indwe was probably the first classic "company town' in South
Africa, owned, laid out and controlled by the company which possessed the
mines. And the presence of the company explains the originally private
railway line.
Two other facets of local history are extraordinary. Between 1880 and
1920 the land in the district surrounding the town was cleared of its
occupants not merely once but three times. In an era before forced
removal drew much comment this frequency was nonetheless more than a
little unusual. And, to add another numerical curiosity, the railway
station at this tiny settlement was, before but especially for some years
after the turn of the century, one of the busiest passenger terminals in
the Cape, ranking after the four largest towns in the number of passengers
arriving and departing.3 Behind these oddities lies the intricate story
of a series of struggles fought in the area, and of its special
connections with places far away. Control over land and control over
labour were perhaps the two main prizes sought, but not necessarily won,
in these struggles.
Indwe to 1B95
In common with other areas of the eastern Cape, dramatic changes in the
distribution of population took place around Indwe at the time of the
cattle-killing in 1857. Prior to that time, 'Kreli' (Bandile), Gcaleka
chief, had occupied some of the upper reaches of the Indwe river.* The
disturbances of the late fifties meant that few people in the region could
claim ancestral rights over land on which they ended up living. At the
same time, there were powerful incentives in the Cape's increasingly
commercial economy to establish rights to land. In the Stormberg area,
quite apart from the value of agricultural land, coal deposits were
beginning to develop a new significance along with expansion and
structural change in the economy.
The existence of coal in the Stormberg region of the north-eastern Cape
was widely known before the Indwe area became part of the Colony.7 The
first commercial mining operations were conducted south of Burghersdorp;
the town, Molteno was laid out on the farm owned by George Vice, early
coal owner, in lBVt.13 There was relatively little commercial interest,
at least among whites, in the eastern extremities of 'the Albert district
until after 1872, when the Wodehouse division was created in that vicinity
in order to balance the number of eastern and western representatives to ,
be elected to the Cape's first responsible parliament. But the area was
hardly 'unoccupied' at the time, as Theal suggested: a variety of people
lived there, including 'numerous bodies of Fingoes and other Natives', as
well as white settlers who laid claim to extensive farms.** By the early
1870s the land in what became the Wodehouse division had largely been
surveyed, and farms granted to claimants or sold.10 Dordrecht, founded
in 1856, grew rapidly with these developments, to the point at which the
Standard Bank established a branch in 187<t." But the edges of the
district along the Indwe river remained 'unsettled' and most of the land,
though occupied by various people, remained legally in the hands of the
government. It was in this area that some of the most promising coal
seams in the Cape Colony appeared to lie, and with the expansion of coal
consumption in railways - rapidly extending inland in the mid-seventies -
there were strong incentives to mine the fuel. Thus mining operations
were reported from the vicinity of the Indwe river in lB77.le
The boom of the early seventies was followed by a minor slump from 1875
onwards. Tension among people around the colonial frontier escalated into
war after the failure of the harvest in large areas in 1877-78. The
result of the war was defeat for the Gcaleka and their allies, and renewed
mass removal of the African population of the eastern Cape and southern
Transkei. The end of the war hrought merchants in the border or frontier
districts the prospect of 'an extension of ... trade hitherto altogether
unprecedented'.13 The reaction consequent on the removal of large
colonial forces after the war rendered this prediction oversanguine, and
local merchants acquired an incentive to diversify. In this context, a
group of Dordrecht merchants and associates had begun to take a keen
interest in the coal outcrops around the Indwe river. A group of them
took out mineral leases on three areas near the Indwe river, each of which
surrounded an area of exposed coal. Minimal development work took place,
but there was a small output of coal, sufficient to attract the attention
of local and central colonial officials."*
Before any more grandiose scheme of coal mining could be implemented, the
area around Dordrecht and the Indwe river was shaken by renewed
hostilities. This time the Thembu groups of Emigrant Tembuland and
Tembuland Proper joined the 'rebellion' - a strange term, since the Thembu
across the Indwe were not living in the Colony. By December I860 Colonial
forces had proved too much far the Thembu 'rebels' and had driven several
thousand people out of the northern reaches of Tembuland (both Emigrant
and Proper).in
Meanwhile, the establishment of numerous joint-stock companies altered the
shape of the colonial economy. Many such ventures were formed at
Kimberley in connection with diamond mining, but the phenomenon was also
evident at the ports and in other areas to undertake a variety of
activities. Late in 1881 and during 18B2, a number of companies came into
being to mine coal in various parts of South Africa - partly because of
the greatly expanded market provided not only by renewed railway
extension, but by the use of machinery in the Kimberley mines. Rhodes and
Rudd were on the board of one - the Kimberley Coal Mining Company - formed
in 1881 to mine near Winburg in the Orange Free State. Merchants and
landowners in the border areas of the Eastern Cape displayed great
activity in forming companies to mine coal in the north-eastern Cape.
Among these were the Great Stormberg and Cyphergat, whose properties were
in the vicinity of Molteno, and the Indwe Coal Mining Company - the
last-named really a partnership set up by Dordrecht merchant-farmers,
whose interests included land over a substantial area as well as leases
over prospective coal areas.'*
During and after the 1880 'rebellion', as noted above, a substantial strip
of land south of the Drakensberg and east of the Indwe river was cleared
of most of its occupants. Indeed, the Tembuland Commission of 1882-3
reported, to the subsequent approval of the government, that these
northern parts of Tembuland should become an area of 'European'
settlement, thus determining the general position of the Transkei border
for a century and more to follow.1'7 "Rebels' would be resettled either
in the southern reaches of Tembuland or in the adjacent (East Griqualand)
districts of Qumbu and Tsolo. The dispersal of large groups of starving
people into the Colony and further afield meant that there was relatively
ample land for the remaining part of the population, but the decision
nevertheless placed a large new area at the disposal of the Cape Lands
department and surveyors. Many of the new farms were granted by the
Commission to those whose claims to prior occupation, loyalty to the
colony, whiteness and/or allocation by the previous chiefs were approved.
Others were sold - much to the chagrin of the Afrikaner Bond which
petitioned for smaller allotments - in lots too large for the majority of
whites to buy. The wishes of some continuing occupants of the farms -
loyal Africans who had not been resettled and whose claims were not heard
by the Commission - were not entertained. In reality, the farms in the
area, like the private and Crown land to the west of the Indwe river,
continued to be occupied by just such a population, as well as by
returnees subsequent to the rebellion. Some of the land thus occupied was
either owned or leased by the partners in the Indwe company.
The Indwe coal promoters had been denied indirect government support by
the decision to extend the East London-Queenstown railway to the Orange
River via Molteno and Burgersdorp, rather than Dordrecht. Mines in the
Molteno area were enabled to supply coal directly into railway trucks and
the eastern system of the Cape Government Railways (CGR) purchased fuel
there, especially after completion of the railway in 1883.1B The Indwe
coal seams were thus placed more than 90 km from the nearest point on the
railway, allowing for the terrain, which made the likely length of a rail
connection much greater than the straight line distance. The Dordrecht
merchants concerned, though the wealthiest local figures and politicians
like 3.L. Bradfield were among them, could not muster capital which would
see to the necessary railway connection, and instead interested
Kingwi11iamstown merchants (particularly J. Weir and E.J. Byrne) in
supporting their project. The latter formed the Imvani and Indwe Railway
Company and the two groups employed their political connections to secure
a different form of government support: the promise of a substantial land
grant should the railway to the Indwe area be completed. The government
would reserve 25 000 morgen of land in the vicinity of the coal mines, to
be selected by the company, to be transferred on completion of the
railway. On this basis the two companies - Indwe Coal and Imvani Rail -
were merged under the name of the latter.1''
Hardly had the ink dried on the documents concerning the privileges of the
company than the process of forced removal, lately accomplished by war
against the 'rebels', began again, this time to clear the farms 'reserved*
for the company of their inhabitants. Removals began in the winter of
1882 and continued into 1883. By the middle of that year substantial
opposition had been organised, and eventually, at a meeting in August, it
was agreed that no further action would be taken for a time.20 The
central reason for loss of enthusiasm on the part of the government was
not only organised opposition to the removals, for the motive of the
exercise had faded. The promoters of the company were unable to secure
sufficient capital to commence construction of the railway, without which
there would be no need to transfer the land to the company. While the
shareholders in the venture were able to enjoy the prospect of future
capital gains from the rising value of farms which they had purchased in
the vicinity of Indwe, not to mention those promised by government should
they succeed, the company proved an immediate drain on their pockets.
Expenditure on the mining operations exceeded any returns. A tiny
workforce of ten or a dozen picked coal at the Indwe lease, with no hope
of effective competition in the colonial market without a railway
connection.111 Presumably the gathering recession in the Cape economy
discouraged potential investors. It was not until 1886 that the economy
showed signs of recovery, and long before that, Cape investors - not to
mention overseas capitalists - had shown a far greater interest in
Transvaal gold shares (Pilgrims Rest, Barberton etc) than mining ventures
in the 'old Colony'.He
The completion of various extension railways, especially that to Kimberley
in 1885, changed the shape of the coal market in South Africa. The price
of coal at Kimberley came down by a large percentage, and excluded South
African coals from competition unless their transport costs could be much
reduced. Within a year or two, exploitation of coal deposits in the
Transvaal - at Boksburg in particular - excluded the Witwatersrand from
the potential market for coal from the Cape and Natal for the immediate
future. The lack of a connecting line between the eastern system and the
midland lines cut off eastern Cape coal producers from the Kimberley
market.Ba Only with such a railway connection (and other Cape) coals be
competitive at Kimberley, and in the rapidly expanding railway market of
the Cape as a whole.
Nevertheless) in the late eighties,so bouysnt did the demand for colonial
coal become, even without new railways, that extensive exploration
proceeded. In the Glen Grey district, near present-day Indwe, at least
one location headman marshalled local forces to develop a small mine.
Thomas Zwedaba was asked by the Magistrate at Lady Frere (now Cacadu) to
supply coal, but the difficulties of transport which he faced were
practically insurmountable.8"
It was in this context of growing demand that the proprietors of the Indwe
Company negotiated with the Cape government during 1869 for the sale of
their mining rights to the latter. The government's interest was
complex. The demand for coal on the railways cannot alone explain the
sudden determination to develop colonial mineral resources. I have
suggested elsewhere that, in IBS'?, Sprigg's administration switched to a
policy of internal economic development from its previous commitment to
servicing the mining industry in territories to the north.Hn Whatever
the precise reasons, for the first time there appeared to be the
reasonable prospect of government investment in support of colonial coal
mining; with this move came the possibility of substantial profits for the
Indwe shareholders. But the government refused to offer more than £50
000, while the Indwe Company - initially demanding £100 000 for its coal
interests - was not prepared to drop below £75 000. Negotiations were
broken off at the end of 1889K"', and the Indwe promoters turned
elsewhere for support or sale. Their hopes of direct government capital
support were destroyed by the defeat of Sprigg's government in July 1890,
and the accession to power of Rhodes's first ministry - which was clearly
opposed to government investment in Cape mining development. The only
aid, intriguingly, which Cape coal mining received was the government's
agreement to build the long-awaited 'junction' line between Stormberg and
Middelburg. The nett effect of this line would be to lower still further
the price of coal at Kimberley, where there was only one major customer.
Although the government also obtained parliamentary approval for the
raising of funds to construct a line to Indwe, the latter did not
materialise. At the same time, Merriman, Commissioner of Crown Lands and
Public Works in the new cabinet, sought to terminate the Imvani and Indwe
Company's hold on government land in the Indwe area - including farms in
the Glen Grey district - which continued to exist, despite the failure of
the proprietors even to start the construction of the Indwe railway.
Threatened with a scant three months' notice of termination in 1891, the
promoters finally moved rapidly - to stall any rash moves on the part of
the state.E'"'
A powerful card in the company's hands was the inaction on the part of
government over the building of the Indwe railway. The government had
devoted a large sum to the east-midland junction line, which might well
not pay unless coal from Indwe were to be sent over it as well as the
other fuels from inferior or at least much smaller collieries.
Profitability seemed to require a branch line to Indwe. Seizing the
initiative, the Indwe company's directors offered to build the railway via
a new route - Sterkstroom to Indwe - in return for a cash grant, plus a
new land grant deal under which the company would give up its rights to
many of its Glen Grey district farms (more suited to its purposes had the
Imvani-Indwe line ever been built) in return for the promise of the same
total area of land, mainly to be selected around the coal mines. The
government was also held at bay with new assurances that the Indwe Company
was busily raising funds in Britain, to assist with which the former threw
in an additional grant in the form of 2000 acres of coal-bearing land to
be selected by the Company.--"
Turning to private interests for aid as well as to government, it was,
ironically, with Rhodes's own De Beers Consolidated that the Indwe Company
found the interest which would transform the Indwe mines into a
significant concern. Having established a near-monopoly of diamond
mining, De Beers was engaged in driving its production costs to lower
levels. Fuel remained a substantial area of expense: local coal mining
offered the prospect of savings over the imported article, if only the
necessary railway lines could be. provided. In pursuit of the most
economical local fuel, De Beers conducted tests on coals from mines in the
Cape, Natal, Free State and Transvaal during 1891, as a result of which
the company had entirely switched to South African coal (and wood) for
fuel by the middle of 1893.2"» From the Indwe point of view, what was
most significant was that the results of De Beers' tests put Indwe coal
second after Natal samples. It was, presumably, the prospect of Indwe
coal contributing to reduced costs which finally induced De Beers to agree
to the proposals of the Imvani and Indwe proprietors to establish a new
company, in which De Beers would invest substantial capital, to build a
railway to the mine, develop output capacity, and employ the the extensive
land grant which it was (still) hoped to acquire from the government in
connection with the proposed railway to profitable ends.
The disposition of De Beers to involve itself in this manner in the Indwe
area may have derived in part from Rhodes's political situation. The
cabinet crisis of 1893 placed several of the more prominent members of his
first ministry on the opposition benches, and to continue in office Rhodes
was forced to rely more heavily on the support of the Afrikaner Bond.
Although the Prime Minister enjoyed substantial sway over that party by
virtue of his financial dealings with some of its leaders, it was
necessary to demonstrate at least some propensity to carry out its
programme. That called for a greater degree of interest in the internal
economic development of the Cape than the first Rhodes ministry had
demonstrated. Although Rhodes and Sivewright, his minister of railways
(Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works) would not agree to direct
government involvement in railway building within the colony, they were
prepared to offer incentives to private companies to undertake such
works. The departure of Sivewright in scandalous circumstances during
189't perhaps helped matters along, given his tendency to favour
non-colonial mines such as those of Lewis and Marks at the Vaal
River.30 It was in this way that the Indwe Railway, Collieries and Land
Company came to be formed in Kimberley in late 189*1. The shares were
divided between De Beers, the public and the promoters, only the public
actually paying immediately for ther holdings. Starting the railway was a
matter of some urgency, to avoid forfeiting the 25 000 morgen of land in
the vicinity of the Indwe river.31
Before the company could turn its assets to account, three major elements
were required. Efficient and inexpensive transport to the markets of the
Cape was needed; to this end the railway - now proposed to run to
Sterkstroom, some distance north of Oueenstown rather, than Imvani - had to
be constructed. Its completion would bring title to the substantial area
of land which the company was set to acquire. But in order to secure full
possession of the land, more than title would be necessary. A second
prerequisite was thus that the large number of people who appeared to be
squatting on the farms had to go. The fact that the population of the
district around Indwe would be very substantially reduced thereby did not
seem important to the company, though a third necessity would prove to
depend on keeping people in the area rather than pushing them out of it.
That requirement was the existence of a labour force to work the mines,
without which the coal deposits over which the company maintained its
legal control would be worthless.
The new Indwe company set about achieving the preconditions for its
success with great vigour. The railway was commenced almost immediately;
the company sought ways of ridding its land of unwanted residents (some of
whom were entirely legal tenants), and at the same time the managers
brought in to run the greatly extended mining operations explored ways of
securing a labour force.
Although the construction of the railway was not achieved without some
mishaps - the Indwe Company contracted with Pauling, a firm responsible
for a number of disasters in Cape railway works - it proceeded smoothly by
comparison with efforts to expel the farm population and to find an
adequate work force. One problem was with legally established tenants of
the government, who were living on and farming large segments of the
Company's hoped-for lands. Some were white, others Africansi and there
were those who fitted neither category clearly - typical of the social
milieu of the time. The government sidestepped its responsibility to
dispose of this petty landed group by transferring not only title but also
existing leases to the Indwe company - thus reducing substantially the
area of farmland which the company could let out to its greater profit
(though substantial rentals continued to accrue to the company for
twenty-four years thereafter). Although a large number of people had been
expelled from the farms reserved for the original Indwe company (or,
strictly, its successor in the shape of the Imvani and Indwe company)
during the eighties, still more seemed to have entered the Indwe area and
settled - no doubt mainly illegally - on the farms reserved; for many
lessees 'permitted a large number of natives to reside upon such farms',
in the words of the magistrate at Dordrecht. Worst of all, from the
immediate point of view of the Indwe Company's directors, was the
existence of a large squatter population on the site of the proposed
town. In order to sell sites in the town, the land would have to be
surveyed; the more quickly this could be achieved, the more rapid the
realisation of handsome profits would be. With considerable irritation,
F. Schermbrucker, the mercurial Cape politician and managing director of
the Company, appealed to the responsible minister to ensure that the
reserved farms were cleared of their population before the state handed
them over to the Company.33 As in so many far more recent cases, the
farm residents fought a rearguard action which kept them on the land in
question for a few more months. In this action they enlisted the support
of James O'Brien, editor of the Frontier Guardian of Dordrecht; for a
period, Rhodes himself stalled the removal of people from the future
townsite. In some ways this limited success in the struggle over land
merely ensured greater impoverishment, however, for having stayed beyond
the commencement of the growing season, many lost their crops when forced
to move before they could reap.3"
Finding a place to dump the farm residents proved to be a difficult matter
for the Cape government. In the early eighties, mass relocation had been
possible because of the direct military defeat of substantial groups under
their chiefs; their dispossession had allowed government to accomplish an
elaborate series of checkerboard moves of large groups of people. But by
the mid-nineties, the shortage of land in many areas of the 'native
territories' had altered the situation. The native affairs department and
its representatives in the Glen Grey district were engaged in the
implementation of rather different strategies from those which had
characterised earlier times; their reluctance to accommodate numbers of
new arrivals was compounded by this shift in policy under Rhodes's
government. Although some people were pushed into Glen Grey and some of
the Transkeian districts, it fell to the Indwe Company to accommodate
numbers of its inherited tenants and squatters on its own land.
Two strands of company practice ran through the resolution of this
problem. One was marked by a continued insistence on use of devices made
possible by past government policies: in this instance, the effective
creation of a new rural location in the midst of the company's lands - not
a private location, but a piece of government ground. The Company's
success in achieving this solution was facilitated by the fact that the
total area of land selected for its grant exceeded the extent permitted in
the enabling Act; the forfeiture of one farm was required, and the
directors conveniently selected one leased (originally from the government
and subsequently from the company) by Charles Maqubela. On resumption by
the government of this farm, it became the Guba Government Location, and
Maqubela was transformed from tenant to headman.aB
There was a clear recognition in the Indwe Company that Maqubela's
location would be a potential local labour reserve, and the possibility of
extending the pattern onto the Indwe company's own land obviously
existed. A portion of the company's ground was therefore earmarked for
use as an area on which rent-paying mine labour tenants could be settled.
The area set aside was rather smalli however, and it appears that the
company had in mind the idea that its private tenants would shelter
subtenants who would provide in turn a reservoir of labour for the mines.
In this approach they differed radically from some other areas of the
country at the time: the clearest example, perhaps, comes from Pilgrims
Rest, where Transvaal Gold Mining Estates used a major tract of its own
land (which it had purchased) to establish and retain the services of rent
paying mine labour tenants.3« On the other hand, the various uses to
which huge areas of company-owned land in the Transvaal were put must have
included arrangements similar to those developed at Indwe at this time,
albeit usually involving a greater distance between mines and residential
farms.37
Social relations at Indwe
If not by the time the new Indwe Company began to operate its
much-expanded coal mines in February 1895, then certainly shortly
thereafter, a great complexity of relationships of domination, control and
exploitation had been developed in the area surrounding the mines. In
traditional analytic style, let us begin to examine them at the point of
production. The mines at Indwe were of an intriguing type, for the coal
seams cropped out at the base of a small plateau feature, and underlay
most of that formation. The strata of the Karoo group of rocks in that
area are almost horizontal, and the coal seams sloped a mere two degrees
upwards from the outcrop. The upward slope had the added advantage that
the coal and waste rock could be extracted from the mines by gravity. The
formation was a far cry from deep coal pits in Natal or elsewhere; there
was little gas, and ventilation could readily be supplied by vertical
shafts of a few hundred feet, fairly easily sunk from the surface of the
plateau above the mines. Despite these apparent advantages which arose
from the natural features of Indwe coal, the work was considered to be
harder than in most other mines in southern Africa. Among the reasons for
this reputation were other natural elements, as well as some rather more
socially determined features. The former included the thinness of the
coal seams, which required the removal of an extremely large amount of
waste if the working areas of the mine were to be high enough even to
crouch in; additionally, there were features of the rock which made the
manual tasks of mining especially difficult. These drawbacks were, of
course, exacerbated by management practices which rendered working
conditions excruciating for white miners, and still worse for black.
Labour in the Indwe mines consisted of holing by manually driving metal
rods into the rock, crowbarring and picking the coal and waste rock using
the purchase provided by holing, and shovelling and hauling the materials
out of the mine. Ancillary tasks included stacking pit-props and
occasional blasting, the former a relativly little used method given the
practice of leaving pillars in the mines to support the roof, and the
latter avoided because of the undue quantities of waste generated, not to
mention the scrambling of coal and waste. Indeed, a major task outside
the. mines involved sorting the coal and waste; not only did the fuel have
to be separated from the latter, but the coal had to be sized to suit
different customers; poor mixtures of different sized lumps of coal would
reduce the value of the product. The sorting screens were worked by small
armies of women as well as men, almost all Africans, supervised by a few
African and white men. Inside the mine, the division of labour was mainly
between skilled and unskilled men, though finer gradations could be
discerned between older and.newer hands and between mere miners and those
in charge of work in different sections. Those in skilled positions were
frequently imported from elsewhere; Cornish miners were the rule rather
than the exception, while the few Africans deemed to be skilled were
pushed from supervisory positions by combinations among the whites.3a
From the beginning, much of the actual work - of development and of
winning the coal - in the mines was farmed out to contractors. The latter
were responsible for hiring workers, maintaining equipment and a myriad
other tasks. They were supposed to work to the plan of the mining
manager, but conflict frequently erupted between these levels in the
hierarchy. There were usually company-hired teams at work, under the
supervision of company employees, in some areas of the mine while
contractors' teams would be at work elsewhere. Although the stucture of
relationships at work differed between these two models, the same people
frequently moved back and forth between them (though not across levels in
the hierarchy). African workers might work for a time directly in the
employ of the company, and then spend a spell doing much the same work
under a contractor; among the supervisory/contracting group, the Hillhouse
family were almost ubiquitous, at times contracting, and at other times
again working on the Indwe Company's payroll. A fairly rigid hierarchy
can thus be observed in the division of labour, with a degree of fluidity
in the particular expression of relationships.
Moving beyond the immediate production of coal, the relationships between
people in the Indwe district and the company become more complex. Most of
those relationships were mediated through land, and most of the land was
controlled in some way by the Indwe company.
The case of the supervisory/contracting 'class' reveals a wide disparity
of relationships with the company, mostly involving the question of IRC&L
land. Some of these men were deeply involved in attempts to accumulate,
and their contracting to the Indwe Company represented one means which
they would employ to achieve this end. At the same time as they would,
then, seek the cheapest labour to accomplish contract work, they were
often also involved in recruiting labour for mines (and perhaps other
sectors) in other areas. During the 1890s at the latest some of the
earlier generation of the Hillhouse family acted as labour agents,
recruiting for the mines of the Witwatersrand and elsewhere simultaneously
with contracting and mining for the Indwe Company. The two sets of
activity had a tendency to contradict one another, even if the intensity
with which particular individuals could carry them on at once was low.
Among Africans too there were many activities which could generate some
accumulation in the little empire created by the Indwe Company with the
help of De Beers. The various inducements offered to workers by the Indwe
company provided an immediate set of trade goods: cattle> meat, beer, and
land were commodities in great demand around Indwe, and the workers took
full advantage of what was available. Not in all cases could the results
have been described as accumulation, but merely, perhaps, as increasing
leisure time and enhancing the quality of life.
In the town of Indwe itself the mining company provided the fledging
environment for accumulative opportunities. Descendants of 1820 settlers
who the directors of the museum at Grahamstown might not like to
acknowledge, with names like Isaacs and Dawidslinger, performed building
work, produced vegetables and carried out innumerable other tasks which
made Indwe a livable environment. As a new town in the mid-nineties,
Indwe lent new possibilities to people from the older towns of the Eastern
Cape: that was why it attracted people from, say, Queenstown. Similarly,
southern European traders found the towns of Thembuland profitable
environments for their businesses: first Cala in the eighties, then Indwe
in the nineties and after. Small business flourished, at least for a
time:and in turn provided storekeepers with the opportunity to enter into
land dealing, at purchase as well as rental. Such a family was the
Costellos, the head of which house was at Cala, with several members
scatttered widely over the 'border' districts. Intermarriage between such
families helped to boost the resources required for the most rapid
accumulation device: control over land. Lease) or better yet purchase of
a farm from the Indwe Company offered the possibility of immediate returns
through rents collected from African tenants. Appreciation in value and
subdivision and sale were prospects which landowners could contemplate
with equanimity. The immediate stumbling block was the reluctance of the
company to part with its land holdingsi which had absorbed almost all the
Crown land at all close to Indwe; the little other private land was not
infrequently in the hands of the directors of the company themselves,
particularly Bradfield, Byrne and Duqmore.
Although there were, then, private tenants of private landlords, most of
the African farm residents of the Indwe area were either tenants of the
company itself, or of its own lessees. On land in the direct control of
the company, residents were obliged to pay rent, and gradually the
practice developed of making labour service for the company a condition of
continued residence. It was hard to extend this practice in any form to
farms leased to private tenants, except by threatening the termination of
leases; and that threat was indeed used. On company farms, in fact, it
was difficult enough to enforce the labour regime, and at least in the
first two or three years of mining the company did not rely on its own
tenants for much of its labour supply. This situation suggests an
extremely incomplete reduction to landlessmness of the population of the
Indwe district, though not only did the company have formal title but also
had the advantage, with respect to securing complete control, of the
state's two-time expulsion of the population of the land concerned. Thus,
although many of the residents of the farms did supply labour to the mines
on an irregular basis, for many of those people it was labour performed to
a considerable degree on their own terms. While within the labour process
they were subjected to considerable control, their own effective
determination of the frequency and even duration of work had profound
effects on the work performed in the mines.
No doubt in consequence of its inability to secure effective control not
only of its lands but of the potential workforce which lived thereon, the
Indwe company was forced to rely on a substantial labour supply from
further afield. The Glen Grey and Xalanga districts, and even others to
which earlier Indwe residents had been moved such as Oumbu and Tsolo,
supplied some of this labour. Coming from further away, workers from
those districts followed a migrant pattern, and fell more completely under
the control of the company while at Indwe. But their relations with the
company were not particularly simple, and in the longer term the
significance of their presence was the failure of the Indwe company to
stabilise a labour supply on which production in the mines could
satisfactorily be based.
Changes in power: Indwe 1896-1906
In the second half of the nineties the primary difficulties encountered by
the IRC8.L were confronted, and in part solved. While the costs of
production had been 50V. higher than the original estimates, there were
improvements; the company was better able to supply coal at more
competitive rates, and its production grew. Indwe coal supplied all De
Beers' needs by mid-1896. Contracts with the CGR took up additional
output. By 1899 the IRC&.L mine produced well over 100 000 tons a year,
which for a South African colliery at the turn of the century was a very
substantial amount. About 60 whites and 1100 Africans were employed by
the company and its contractors at Indwe; the township had been laid out
and largely sold on quitrent terms; paying tenants on short leases lO
occupied most of the farms; and all seemed set for a period of
uninterrupted profits. lndeed> the company had already assumed a regular
practice of a 5'/, half-yearly dividend, thus gaining the distinction of
being the only Cape coal mining venture which ever paid substantial
returns."0
The prosperity of the Indwe company was made possible by the possession of
its railway and land rights. The non-coal goods and passenger traffic
paid for working the railway, while the revenue from town and farms paid
for the cost of borrowed capital. It should thus have been relatively
easy for the company to produce profits on its coal business, and in the
years immediately prior to the outbreak of war it did succeed.
Management, though costly, was improved by appointing G. Dugmore as
resident General Manager at Indwe> instead of running the company from
offices in Kimberley and Cape Town. Although the labour supply was never
considered adequate, production proceeded uninterrupted.*» This
relatively satisfactory performance ended, however, during the war.
The tension between the use of the company's lands to contribute to
short-term management needs such as covering the interest on borrowings
and the potential longer-term value of the farms in establishing a stabe
labour supply for the coal mines, was particular obvious at the end of the
war (1901). The shortage of labour in the mines meant that strenuous
efforts were made to increase the labour force through farm settlement, at
exactly the same time as the floating of a number of proposals for a
scheme of capitalised white-owned farming on the same land, sale of
portions thereof to farmers, and longer leases over considerable areas for
white and black lessees.<>K To add to its difficulties, the IRCUL found
that not only had the war disrupted migration and labour supply patterns,
but though a greater population than ever was living in districts close to
Indwe, the 'high' wages offered by imperial forces kept workers away from
the mines.
In consequence of its inability to determine the pattern of labour at
Indwe, the company soon ran into great difficulties in keeping its
production up to the required levels - required by the demands of
contracts with both De Beers and the Cape Government Railways. The excuse
offered by the 1RC&L to De Beers was perenially that of labour shortage,
and the response of De Beers - despite its interest in the profitability
of the Indwe company - was to contract for coal supplies elsewhere. With
De Beers, the Indwe company enjoyed some minimal leverage through the
former'^ interest in the latter's dividends (and this may explain De Beers
attempts to sell Indwe shares during June 1902); but from the CGR under a
restored Sivewright regime, the Indwe company could expect no help. Thus,
while De Beers policy at this stage does not seem to have been shaped by
anything other than the most scrupulous attention to profitability (and
cost cutting was an inevitable component of that), the CGR's fuel orders
were subject to much more variable and political pressures. This
difficulty was compounded by tarriff changes on the railways after the
war, when low Central South African Railways rates made it more economic
for De Beers to use Natal rather than Indwe coal. And, in any event, the
Indwe mines struggled to maintain output due to their inability to keep a
regular labour supply-
Faced with these constraints) Indwe management experimented with a variety
of strategies. One was to contract out all areas of the Indwe mine to the
Hillhouse family. In the short term the contractors were able to reduce
costs and maintain labour supplies, but that situation could not continue
indefinitely. Equipment and labour relations in the mines deteiorated
uunder this regime» until the Indwe management resumed control and
congratulated itself on disposal of the 'Hillhouse incubus'. But
contractors had the advantage of being in close touch with the origins and
direction of labour flows, on which the company had to rely; it was only a
matter of time until local contractors would have to be brought back into
the mines.
During this period, the Indwe company made strenuous but uneven efforts to
utilise its potential 'labour reserve' by securing not only settlement but
effective work output by Africans on some of its farms. The key to
satisfactory performance was a means of ensuring that farm residents
worked more regularly. Individuals paying rent on the farms were issued
with thirty-day tickets which were supposed to be worked off as one of the
conditions for remaining on the farms; but in practicei as indicated
earlier, few farms residents actually worked at all regularly. Thus, in
1901j one Peter Peve, a resident of farm 19 block 3, worked only four days
in two months, while Peter Matross, who had only worked 1 *• days in six
months, owed in addition a substantial amount of rent. In 1902, Futshana
Moss, typical of many others, took five months to complete one ticket.
The strategy adopted was two-pronged. Farm residents were threatened with
eviction (and some, like August Salman in September 1902, were evicted)
for their failure to work in the mines. As a result, in 1902 and 1903 the
mine-labour tenant system did work a little more effectively, and was
extended to new areas of land with the non-renewal of certain leases -
especially of some black tenants (such as Witbooi Makatese). The company
arranged ploughing of lands to encourage more tenants to settle on the
farms. And, as a second prong, IRC8.L renewed its own direct recruiting,
particularly focussing on labour from Basutoland. Officials and
contractors were sent out widely to recruit, and agents were retained to
secure Sotho workers from flliwal North and other points of entry into the
Cape."3
Recruiting further afield did not solve the Indwe company's problems.
Instead, it brough strike action by migrant workers in its train. Over
the 1902 Christmas period, several short strikes took place and bodies of
Sotho workers abandanoned the mines."" Nevertheless, the result of the
company's efforts was that during 1903 the labour supply position
improved. For a period the Indwe mines succeeded in producing sufficient
to satisfy railway contracts, though their Kimberley market was slipping
away. Severe recession in 1901* reduced the demand for coal and increased
the labour supply;"' but by the time this easier if less profitable
period passed, competition for labour around Indwe had increased to
unprecedented heights, and rendered the company's control still weaker
than before.
Migrant labour and Indwe - 1TO6 - 1912
Mention has been made of the effects of competition for labour in the
Indwe area from the armies of the Anglo-Boer War. From 1903 onwards, once
the IRC&L had finally sold its railway to the CGR at a very substantial
profit, the construction of the Indwe-Maclear extension line generated
vexed conditions in the labour market from the point of view of the coal
company. But neither of these sources of competition could compare with
the impact of the Witwatersrand on the area around Indwe.
The flow of labour from the broad Transkeian territories to the
Witwatersrand had accelerated at different phases from the early
nineties. The construction of the original railway to Indwe facilitated
the movement of labour to the Witwatersrand, making Indwe a major centre
in the labour system of southern Africa and proving profitable to the
IRC&L through the carriage of thousands of passengers at minimal cost to
the company. By 190? at least 200 Africans passed through Indwe every day
en route to or from the mines, affording opportunities to all manner of
operators, not only the company, to profit from their needs.'"' Even
today, the Blue Crane (originally Royal) hotel, opposite the station,
depends for its survival on the trade which booms with each train's
arrival.
Matters in the labour field deteriorated still further from 1906 onwards
as the intensity of recruiting efforts for the Witwatersrand stepped up
rapidly in districts neighbouring Indwe, and even in the town itself. The
phenomenon of recruiting in a wide variety of forms was reported from Lady
Frere, Cala and Indwe. In 1905 the Witwatersrand Native Labour
Association opened a branch in Indwei and in that year over 10 000 African
workers travelled through the town on their way to Johannesburg. Within a
year the WNLA system had collapsed within South Africa, but in the Indwe
area it was speedily replaced by private recruiting systems involving
touts, runners, canteen and store keepers, as well as agents and
contractors in the towns. Advances were frequently paid in cash (not
cattle) to recruits in the Indwe area. Whatever techniques were used,
they were undoubtedly effective, for the number of recruits passing
through Indwe increased very rapidly indeed. Part of the reason for this
increase lies not only in the exertions of recruiters, stressed by Jeeves,
but also in the deterioration of conditions in the 'native' districts of
Glen Grey and Xalanga. For example, the impact of racist constriction of
credit facilities in the period after the Anglo-Boer war at centres like
Cala merits much further investigation; while the competition and conflict
between recruiters, while obviously a significant phenomenon, may have
reduced rather than increased the effectiveness of recruiting. Whatever
the multi-levelled explanation, the numbers of recruits did increase, and
the difficulties experienced by the Indwe Company did not abate, from 1906
onwards.*'
To add to the difficulties of the company, the Cape Government Railways
increased their purchasing of coal from other areas. There was almost
continuous conflict between the company and the railways over the quantity
and quality of coal supplied. In 1909 the company had to reduce its white
workforce substantially as a result of the decline in the contract offered
it by the government. The reduced demands on the mine meant less demand
for labour, but also the prospect of declining and ultimately vanishing
profits for the company. Although these difficulties were compoounded by
the creation of the still-less sympathetic South African Railways in 1910,
sales of coal in other markets were more successful, and the Indwe company
continued to face the difficulties of finding sufficiently reliable labour
to be able to produce at a profit the coal it could sell. Meanwhile the
price of coal in South Africa generally was declining, and by 1912 the
Indwe company could no longer be certain of any level of profit on the
coal for which it could obtain government contracts. At this point it was
decided provisionally to liquidate the company, pending the results of a
year's operations, and in a last attempt to establish its position in the
district the company tried one more strategy for the stabilisation of its
labour force.*s
Liquidation! white settlement and forced removals again
The only option remaining to the management of the Indwe company as long
as both the coal mines and the lands were to be retained was to try to
improve the efficiency of the farms as producers of labour power.
Recognising that the privaely leased farms had never served well in this
1
 connection, it was decided to lease greater areas of land to African
tenants. Those lessees were expected to accommodate increasing numbers of
people on the farms, who would soon begin to provide a more reliable
workforce. Meanwhile, the company would have to hope for improving prices
for coal, though the prospects, as the price offered by the SA Railways
dropped to Us/id per ton, seemed gloomy.
It appears that some of the farms were re-leased in the manner suggested
during 1912 and 1913. By 1915, only 9 of the 21 main farms were leased to
'European tenants', only three constituted the company's 'private native
location', and 7 had 'native tenants' as well as fairly large populations
of 'squatters'. But whether the new labour system would prove effective
was never really tested, for by December 1913 the administration of the
railways had made it abundantly clear that no more coal would be purchased
from Indue after the end of 1916. The stage was thus set for the
liquidation of the company. Having failed to bring the farm population
under adequate control during the life of coal mining, management and
directors, as well as the major shareholder - De Beers - were in no frame
of mind to attempt to bring them under tighter control for new purposes.
With the commencement of liquidation arrangements in 1917, therefore, it
was proposed to sell all the land owned by the IRC&L at auction, and
preparations for that event went ahead. In order to simplify matters the
liquidators proposed the block sale of all the farms to the government as
an addition to the Glen Grey district - from which most of the land had
originally been taken. The Indwe area had been proposed by the Beaumont i
commission as an area of African settlement, and the liquidators had in
view the occupation of the land by African people (which was in reality
the case). But, at the eleventh hour> the Department of Lands in Pretoria
determined to purchase the whole area. The intention of that department
was to settle returning soldiers on allotments carved from the defunct
company's farms, in line with policies favouring state investment in white
land settlement in places as varied as Indwe and Of calaco.'*"
Once the state had again resumed the Indwe lands, the company and its
history were easily forgotten. But in order to settle some hundreds of
white families on the farms, the existing population, largely (though not
exclusively) black, had to to move. Four of the least attractive farms
were transferred to Glen Grey district to overcome the difficulties of
finding space for more people there; most of the settled population was
forced, after some resistance led by Diniweyo Mhlebi and Philgat Mzazi, to
move; the wealthy individual African tenants, like W.B. Rubusana, tried to
fight individually for their 'rights', and were reduced to landlessness
along with the rest. So the story of the Indwe company ended, as it had
begun, in a forced removal; and once more, a forced removal which failed
to guarantee the success of a new venture, for the settlers on the
allotments almost all gave up within a matter of fifteen years.ao
Possession of land seems to mean the right to possession of any produce,
rent or other form of income which can be generated from that land. The
Indwe Company's acquisition of land from the state gave them the right to
a potentially enormous rent, in the broadest sense, from the land -
recognised in the state's eventual purchase of the company's holdings at a
price far greater than the company's shareholders had ever invested. This
exchange occurred despite the fact that the railway built by the Indwe
Company, in return for which the land was granted, was purchased by the
Cape government (the original granters of the land) at a very large profit
to the company in 1902. By the completion of the liquidation of the Indwe
Company, a holder of a single Cl share purchased in 189*1 should have
received, through dividends and liquidation, many times that amount. But
the Company was not the only site of accumulation. Inability on the part
of the IRC&L to realise the potential of its lands meant that lessees were
able to enjoy varying, and sometimes substantial, accruals of profit from
the use of that land. Some lessees were able, through such accumulation,
eventually to become the owners of considerable tracts of land in the
Indwe area. One of the reasons for ineffectual opposition to removal from
the Indwe farms on the part of Africans, when the end came in 1920, was
the division between those who had accumulated substantial fortunes from
their use of IRC&L. land and those who for whatever reason had not done
so. One of the lessons to be drawn from the Indwe experience is that the
combination of private property in land with reasonably free commodity and
monetary exchange can, despite the presence of strong forces working for
the domination of labour by capital, result in the most generalised
struggle to accumulate through the manipulation of exchange relations and
the possession of land. In short, the tenant/migrant/working class is
replete with its own attempts at accumulation, and not only or (in some
cases) even at all with the ideology and practice of a struggle against ,
the domination (attempted or accomplished) of capital (and the state). "
Conclusion
to estabVish {and profit f r o*.) domindtion ovtr otHers« control over }and
(that most peculiar means of production), a mixture of *ays of
understanding what Mas 'proper' in tnese things . . . a l l contr ibuted to
conditioning the peculiar story which has in part been revealed in this
paper. Much nore retains to be done if the lives of people Mho lived in
and passed through the Indw* area are ever to be nore fully recorded.
S t i l l «ore immense is the task of detailing the particularities and
generalities of l i fe in the many areas of South Africa which yet remain
untouched Dy historical investigation, in all of those areas, the
specificities of the land question stand out as among the most important
of the questions requiring attention.
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